The Implications of the Equal Protection Clause for the Mandatory Integration of Public School Students by Brown, Kevin D.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1997
The Implications of the Equal Protection Clause for
the Mandatory Integration of Public School
Students
Kevin D. Brown
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, brownkd@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Education Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brown, Kevin D., "The Implications of the Equal Protection Clause for the Mandatory Integration of Public School Students" (1997).
Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 510.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/510
The Implications of the Equal Protection Clause for
the Mandatory Integration of Public School Students
KEVIN BROWN
Since 1954 America has been involved in efforts to desegregate her
public schools. These efforts were primarily the result of United States
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment Cases in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, like
Brown v. Board of Education,' Green v New Kent County School
Board, and Swanm v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,'
placed a remedial obligation on public school districts that had engaged
in intentional de jure segregation to racially balance their school popu-
lations. At one point over 500 school districts across the country were
under some form of federal court supervision
Despite these efforts, recent reports suggest that desegregation of
public schools peaked in the late 1980s. Public schools actually be-
* Professor of Law, Indiana Universihy. B. Indiana UnhversO 1978, J.D. Yale Law
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faculty colloquium at Northwestern Universit, in December, 1996; and at a falty colloquium
at the National Law School of India in Bangalore, India In Januay 199Z The author would
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
3. 402 US. 1 (1971).
4. See James S. Licbman, Desegregating Politics: All-Out School Desegregation Erpalaned,
90 COLUM. L REV. 1463, 1465-66 (1990).
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
came more segregated in the 1990s.5 As the public schools were be-
coming more segregated, the Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence entered into its final phase. With its 1990 opin-
ion-Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell6-the Supreme
Court began to define what a public school system must accomplish in
order to satisfy the equal protection mandate of eradicating the vestiges
of segregation. The Dowell opinion has been 'followed by two other
school desegregation termination opinions, Freeman v Pitts7 and Mis-
souri v Jenkins.' Pursuant to these cases, federal courts are increasing-
ly withdrawing from their involvement in the desegregation of public
schools and thereby closing an epic chapter in American legal history.
If efforts to desegregate public schools are not destined to reach a
dead end on the federal highway, it is clear that new roads must be
forged through the terriiory of the laws of state and local governments.
Only state and local action will be able to provide an alternative ave-
nue. The recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Sheff
v O'NeilP may spark the most far reaching state endeavor aimed at
desegregating public schools. In Sheff, Connecticut's highest court
placed an affirmative obligation on the state to dismantle racial and
ethnic isolation in Hartford, Connecticut. Unlike school desegregation
cases under the Equal Protection Clause, the affirmative obligation
being imposed on the state in Sheff does not remedy any prior inten-
tional segregative conduct by state officials. The obligation requires
that Hartford maintain a racially and ethnically integrated student body.
The Sheff opinion could provide the blueprint for the construction
of a new superhighway for the desegregation of public schools. The
decision, however, also raises the troubling question of whether the
Supreme Court of the United States has already constructed a road
block to state and local efforts to desegregate public schools. The
5. On December 13, 1993, the Harvard Project on School Desegregation released the results
of a study which shows that 66 percent of all Black students and 74.3 percent of all Hispanio
students attended predominantly minority schools in 1991-92. For African-Americans, these fig-
ures represents the highest level of racial segregation since 1968. See William Cells, I, Study
Finds Rising Concentration of Black and Hispanic Students, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
In 1986 only 63 percent of African-American students were attending predominately minority
schools and in 1968 only 54 percent of Latino students were attending majority-minority
schools. See William Eaton, Segregation Creeping Back in US. Schools, CHRONIcLE, Dec. 14,
1993, at Al.
6. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
7. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
9. 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).
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Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is
considerably different from that which accompanied the revival of the
Equal Protection Clause in the 1950s after "decades of relative desue-
tude."' ° No issue reflects this dramatic shift more than the recognition
that current interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause may proscribe
efforts by state and local governments to engage in mandatory school
desegregation Outside of the public educational context, recent Su-
preme Court opinions express a hostility to the use of racial and ethnic
classifications by governmental units when used to advance even "be-
nign" purposes. Supreme Court opinions like City of Richmond v.
Croson,n Adarand Contractors, Inc v. Pena,"2 and Miller v. Johnson3
have subjected all governmental decision making using racial classifica-
tions to strict scrutiny.
This article will examine the question of whether the Equal Protec-
tion Clause-as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court-proscribes
the mandatory desegregation of public school students in Hartford,
Connecticut. It will conclude by arguing that, despite initial appearanc-
es, the recent Supreme Court cases do not preclude the State of Con-
necticut from discharging its affirmative obligation to dismantle racial
isolation.
Section I reviews the Supreme Court of Connecticut's opinion in
Sheff v O'Neill." Section R examines the United States Supreme
Court's recent cases applying strict scrutiny to governmental decisions
involving racial classifications. This section will focus particular atten-
tion on Miller v Johnson.'s In Miller, the Court struck down a con-
gressional redistricting plan passed by the Georgia General Assembly
that was intended to produce a third majority-minority legislative dis-
trict. The Court stated any time government uses racial classifications,
10. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 US. 265, 290 (1978). According
to Powell's opinion, "The Court's initial view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that Its 'one
pervading purpose' was the 'freedom of the slave mce,, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him.'" Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
71 (1873). But see City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US. at 490-91 (O'Connor, J.) (claiming
that the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment ,as to place clear limits on the
State's use of race as a criterion for legislative action, and to have the federal courts enforce
those limits).
11. 488 US. 469 (1989).
12. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
13. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
14. 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).
15. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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strict scrutiny is triggered. In discharging the affirmative obligation to
dismantle racial isolation of Hartford public school students, Connecti-
cut will almost certainly have to rely on some form of mandatory
school desegregation. Any form of mandatory desegregation-including
school redistricting, busing, redrawing individual school boundary lines,
or freedom of choice plans which impose limitations on the percentage
of students from racial and ethnic groups that can attend a given
school-requires the State of Connecticut to treat its students as mem-
bers of racial and ethnic groups. This section will also examine
Connecticut's attempt to use racial classifications in order to desegre-
gate Hartford public schools in light of strict scrutiny jurisprudence
articulated by prior United States Supreme Court cases.
None of the prior Supreme Court cases provides an adequate justifi-
cation for the use of racial classifications in order to desegregate public
schools. If prior Supreme Court cases are not to stand as precedent for
prohibiting mandatory desegregation, there must be something about
public education that is unique in terms of governmental service. Sec-
tion IR will first point to the conceptual structure that provides the
hidden assumptions which animate the Supreme Court's recent equal
.protection jurisprudence. It will then demonstrate why that structure is
inappropriate when addressing the rights of children in public schools.
The unique features of public education justify a different analysis for
the use of race and ethnic classification in public schools than it does
outside of that context. Public schools are socializing institutions that
inculcate fundamental values necessary to the transmission of our demo-
cratic society to the next generation of adults. Mandatory desegregation
for public schools should be viewed in light of this socializing function.
Thus, whether Connecticut, in discharging its affirmative obligation to
dismantle racial isolation, violates the Equal Protection Clause should
be a question of the message conveyed-i.e., the values being inculcat-
ed-by mandatory desegregation.
Examining the constitutionality of mandatory desegregation by fo-
cusing on the message being conveyed does not determine whether it is
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Section IV will apply
strict scrutiny to racial classification of students for purposes of manda-
tory desegregation by focusing on the values being inculcated. It will
argue that Connecticut has a compelling state interest in inculcating
fundamental values in its public schools. The role of public education
is to convert learners into choosers. Education must both foster indi-
vidual self-determination, but at the same time attempt to constrain the
choices individuals make in order to allow others the same ability for
[Vol. 29:9991002
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self-determination. Depending on where the emphasis is placed, man-
datory desegregation can both further, as well as inhibit, the values
related to self-determination. But mandatory desegregation clearly fur-
thers the values of tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity. Since Con-
necticut's interest in socialization relates to all individual public stu-
dents in Hartford, mandatory desegregation is narrowly tailored to effect
only the individuals that the interest involves. Thus, mandatory deseg-
regation should survive a strict scrutiny analysis when examined from a
value inculcating perspective.
I. S EFF V. O FI
The plaintiffs were eighteen African-American, Latino, and Cauca-
sian school children. They alleged that the defendants-all of whom
were state officials 6-- had a constitutional obligation under Article
Eighth, § 1 and Article First, § 20 to remedy the denial of equal edu-
cational opportunity in the Hartford public schools."7 The plaintiffs'
argument included an assertion that this obligation prohibited both de
facto and de jure racial and ethnic segregation of public schools."8
The percentage of minority students in Hartford actually increased to
94.5% in the 1994-95 school year.19
Except for a brief period in 1868, Connecticut did not intentionally
segregate racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school
system?0 The General Assembly did not enact any legislation that was
intended to cause either de jure or de facto segregation. The State also
16. For example, the governor, the state board of education and various stalte officials were
named as defendants. See 238 Corn. at 4, note 4, 678 A.2d at 1269, note 4.
17. The Connecticut Constitution provides: "All men when they form a social compact, are
equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privi-
leges from the community." CoN. CosmT. art. 1, § 1. The Connecticut Constitution futher
provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segre-
gation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights be-
cause of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability."
CoNN. Cos r. art. , § 20 (as amended by articles V and XXI of the amendments).
18. In the 1991-92 school year, 25.7% of the Connecticut student population were members
of minority groups. The public schools in the capital city of Hartford enrolled the largest
percentage of minority students in the state-92.4% of the student body. See Sheff v. O'Neill,
238 Conn. 1, 38, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287 (1996).
19. See 238 Conn. at 43 n.43, 678 A.2d at 1289 n.43. In conirast, only 7 of the 21 sur-
rounding suburban school systems, had a minority student enrollment in excess of 10 percent.
See j& at 42, 678 A.2d at 1289.
20. See 238 Conn. at 10 n.ll, 678 A.2d at 1274 n.11.
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took various civil rights initiatives between 1905 and 1961 to combat
racial discrimination.1 Since 1970, the State supported and encouraged
voluntary plans for increasing interdistrict diversity, including providing
financial support to interdistrict magnet programs. Furthermore, in
recognition of a "moral obligation to address the adverse consequences
of racial and ethnic discrimination!" the State reorganized the Board of
Education during the 1980s in order to concentrate on the needs of ur-
ban school children and to promote diversity in public schools.'
The trial court concluded that racial and ethnic segregation in Hart-
ford public schools is harmful and that integration would likely have
positive benefits for all children and for society as a whole.24 Relying,
however, on principles drawn from federal equal protection law, the
trial court determined that the plaintiffs could not prevail because they
did not establish that it was state action that caused the conditions
alleged in their complaint. Due to "the importance of the novel and
controversial questions" raised by this case and the fact that it had
languished in the trial court for over six years, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court took the case
Despite the lack of intentional segregation, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut found that the State played a significant role in the present
concentration of minorities in Hartford's schools. The State always
controlled public elementary and secondary education. The legislature
directs many aspects of the local school programs including courses of
study, standardized testing, school attendance and graduation require-
ments. The state legislature also provides considerable financial re-
sources to local schools. In 1909, the State enacted a statute which
fixed the school district boundaries with those of its corresponding
town.' The statute was enacted for the purpose of improving the qual-
ity of education by fostering local control. Nevertheless, it "is the sin-
gle most important factor contributing to the present concentration of
racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school[s]. 27
Under the Connecticut Constitution, the State has an obligation to
provide both a right to a free public elementary and secondary educa-
21. See U at 10, 678 A.2d at 1224.
22. See id at 10, 41; 678 A.2d at 1274, 1288.
23. Id at 41, 678 A.2d at 1288.
24. See id at 33, 678 A.2d at 1285.
25. Id at 7, 678 A.2d at 1272 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-199(c) (1996)).
26. See Ia at 11, 678 A. 2d at 1274 (discussing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-240 (1996)).
27. Id at 11, 678 A.2d at 1274.
[Vol. 29:999
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tion and protection from segregation. According to the majority opin-
ion, these two provisions, working in tandem, place on the State an
affirmative obligation to provide a substantially equal educational op-
portunity to all of Connecticut's school children. "A significant com-
ponent of that substantially equal educational opportunity is access to a
public school education that is not substantially impaired by racial and
ethnic isolation: '
According to the Connecticut Supreme Court:
for the purposes of the present litigation, we decide only that
the scope of the constitutional obligation expressly imposed on
the state by article eighth, §1, is informed by the constitutional
prohibition against segregation contained in article first, §20.
Reading these constitutional provisions conjointly, we conclude
that the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the
public school system deprives school children of a substantially
equal educational opportunity and requires the state to take
further remedial measures."
Thus the court held that Connecticut's constitutional requirement of
equal educational opportunity mandates that the legislature "take affir-
mative responsibility to remedy segregation in our public schools, re-
gardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.1"3
The Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that it was the racial and
ethnic composition of the public schools that triggered the affirmative
obligation to remedy the condition' It is significant to note that the
majority opinion did not rest upon the impact of racial isolation on
28. rd at 24, 678 A.2d at 1280.
29. Id at 25-26, 678 A2d at 1281.
30. Id at 30, 678 A2d at 1283. The Court noted:
the fact that Hartford's schoolchildren labor under a dual burden: their poverty and
their racial and ethnic isolation. These findings regarding the causal relationship
between the poverty suffered by Hartford schoolchildren and their poor academic
performance cannot be read in isolation. They do not diminish the significance of
the stipulations and undisputed findings that the Hartford public school system suffers
from severe and increasing racial and ethnic Isolation, that such isolation is harmful
to students of all races, and that the districting statte codified at § 10-240 Is the
single most important factor contributing to the concentration of racial and ethnic
minorities in the Hartford public school system. The fact a, as pleaded, the plain-
tiffs' complaint does not provide them a constitutional remedy for one of their aElc-
tions, namely, their poverty, is not a ground for depriving them of a remedy for the
other.
a at 39, 678 A.2d at 1287-88.
31. See id at 25-26, 39.40; 678 A.2d at 1281, 1288.
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academic achievement.32 The Supreme Court expressly emphasized the
importance of the socializing aspect of integrated schools as the basis
of its decision.
Schools are an important socializing institution, imparting those
shared values through which social order and stability are main-
tained. Schools bear central responsibility for inculcating the
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democrat-
ic political system. When children attend racially and ethnically
isolated schools, these shared values are jeopardized: If chil-
dren of different races and economic and social groups have no
opportunity to know each other and to live together in school,
they cannot be expected to gain the understanding and mutual
respect necessary for the cohesion of our society. The elimina-
tion of racial isolation in the schools promotes the attainment of
equal educational opportunity and is beneficial to all students
both black and white.33
Justice Berdon in his separate concurring opinion also noted the social-
izing implications of integrated schools:
If the mission of education is to prepare our children to survive
and succeed in today's world, then they must be taught how to
live together as one people. Anything less will surely result in
a segregated society with one racial and ethnic community
pitteq against another. Instead of fostering social division, we
must build an integrated society, commencing with educating
our children in a nonsegregated environment.34
The Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that the current school
districting scheme was unconstitutional. The court, however, decided
that the constitutional imperative of separation of powers required that
it afford the state legislature an opportunity to fashion a remedy that
32. This constitutes one of the major distinctions between the majority opinion and the sepa-
rate opinion filed by Justice Berdon. Berdon noted that poor academic achievement of
Hartford's students is one aspect of the devastating effects of racial isolation. See lt at 51-53,
678 A.2d at 1291-94. He noted the results of a study commissioned by the State Department
of Education in 1989 that concluded that desegregation has had some positive effects on the
reading skills of black youngsters. See ia7 at 52, 678 A.2d at 1293. But Berdon also noted
that racial and ethnic isolation also inhibits the development of social understanding and racial
tolerance. See id at 53, 678 A.2d at 1294.
33. Id at 34, 678 A.2d at 1285 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
34. Id at 53, 678 A.2d at 1294.
[Vol. 29:9991006
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will most appropriately respond to the constitutional violation.3
11. APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
Connecticut has already tried a number of voluntary measures
aimed at decreasing racial isolation in Hartford schools. In order for
the General Assembly to comply with its affimative obligation to dis-
mantle racial isolation, some form of mandatory desegregation will
probably be employed. The trial court in Sheff noted this point when
it indicated that in order to effectively remedy the severe racial, ethnic,
and socioeconomic isolation that exists in the Hartford public school
system, school district lines would have to be redrawn? 6 Other possi-
ble desegregation measures include mandatory busing of students, re-
drawing individual school attendance boundaries, and freedom of choice
plans which impose limitations on the percentage of students from
racial and ethnic groups that can attend a given school. The above
measures share one feature in common-each requires Connecticut to
racially and ethnically classify its public school students and thereby
treat them as members of racial and ethnic groups.
In the summer of 1995, the United States Supreme Court rendered
its most recent affirmative action opinion, Adarand Contractors, Inc v.
Pena This case rescinds the Supreme Court's 1990 holding in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.3" Adarand essentially extends the standard
of review articulated by the Court in its landmark case of City of Rich-
mond v. J. Croson Co.39 to the federal government. In Croson, a
majority of the justices on the Supreme Court agreed that affirmative
action programs should be subjected to strict scrutiny regardless of the
presumed beneficiaries. When government attempts to use a suspect
classification, it can only do so when there is a compelling governmen-
tal interest and it employs means that are narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.4
Affirmative action programs not only involve racially motivated
35. See 14 at 45-46, 678 A.2d at 1290.
36. Sheff v. O'Nei 1995 Conn. LEXIS 249 at *46 (Conn.Super.Ct. June 27, 1995).
37. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
38. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The Court's opinion also appeus to overrule Fullilove v.
Klulznick, 448 US. 448 (1980).
39. 489 US. 469 (1989).
40. See hfiller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995).
1997] 1007
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decision making and racial classification, but they also generate racial
winners and losers. Thus, affirmative action programs can be said to
inflict two different types of harms. Not only does government disre-
spect its citizens' individuality by treating them as members of racial
and ethnic groups, but it also denies members of the dominant group
opportunities to be considered for some tangible benefit.4'
The Court's opinion in Miller v. Johnson42 poses a significant hur-
dle to Connecticut's efforts to discharge its affirmative obligation to
dismantle racial isolation in Hartford public schools. It articulates a
more restrictive scenario for when strict scrutiny applies than that im-
posed by affirmative action cases. In Miller, the Court concluded that
strict scrutiny is triggered by government's treatment of its citizens as
members of racial and ethnic groups. Thus only one harm, the denial
of individuality, is a sufficient constitutional predicate for requiring
strict scrutiny. Before Miller, it could be argued that strict scrutiny
should not apply to the mandatory desegregation of public schools.
.Mandatory desegregation does require government to treat students as
members of racial and ethnic groups. It does not, however, generate
the secondary harm of racial winners and losers. All students maintain
their individual right to a free public education. Thus, the additional
harm imposed on members of the disfavored groups by affirmative ac-
tion programs does not exist; therefore, strict scrutiny should not be
triggered. Miller v. Johnson prevents the State of Connecticut from
asserting this argument.
This section will first discuss Miller v. Johnson. It will then ana-
lyze mandatory desegregation in light of what existing Supreme Court
cases have said about strict scrutiny.
A. Miller v. Johnson
From 1980 to 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional dis-
41. Affirmative action is also seen by many to be in conflict with societal values of effi-
ciency and meritocracy. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFiRMATIvE DISCRIMINATION (1975); Lee
Nisbet, Affwrmative Action: A Liberal Program? in RACIAL PREFERENcE AND RACIAL JUSTICE:
THE NEW AFFRMAnVE AcnoN CONTmo SY 111-16 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991); Burt
Neubome, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1979); George Schatzki, United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L.
REv. 51, 59 (1980); Walter Williams, False Civil Rights Vision and Contempt for Rule of Law,
79 GEO. LJ. 1777 (1991).
42. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
[Vol. 29:9991008
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tricts was a majority-black district43 The 1990 Decennial Census re-
vealed that 27% of Georgia's residents were African-American." The
census also disclosed that the state's increase in population entitled
Georgia to an extra congressional sea. 4 This increase prompted the
Georgia General Assembly to redraw the State's congressional districts.
The General Assembly's redistricting plan had to be submitted for
preclearance to the Bush Administration's Attorney General. The At-
torney General rejected the first two plans submitted because they cre-
ated only two, instead of three, majority black districts 6
Since the General Assembly's third plan created three
majority-black districts, it gained preclearance from the Department of
Justice 7 Elections under the new redistricting plan were held on No-
vember 4, 1992.!' Black candidates were elected to Congress from all
three majority-black districts. The action was filed on January 13,
1994 by five white voters from the Eleventh District49
The Supreme Court faced a situation where, in order to create a
third majority black district, it was clear that the Georgia General As-
sembly classified and treated its citizens as members of racial groups.
Unlike affirmative action plans, however, there was no discriminatory
treatment or effect. The white plaintiffs were not denied the right to
register, vote, or be represented by an elected official from the district
in which they resided. Thus, the plaintiffs as individuals were not sub-
ject to invidious discriminatory treatment. Nor did the redistricting pro-
gram discriminate against whites by making blacks a favored group.
African-Americans were the majority in three of the eleven congressio-
nal districts in Georgia. While constituting 27% of the Georgia popula-
tion, blacks were also a majority in 27% of the Georgia congressional
districts. As a result there was no vote dilution, because the redistrict-
ing plan did not produce any discriminatory effect against whites as a
43. See 1& 115 S. CL at 2483.
44. See I&
45. See I&
46. See id Prior to Congressional redistricting that resulted from the 1990 census, African-
Americans who constituted 11.1% of the voting population were only 4.93S of the members of
Congress. Latinos who constituted 7.3% of the voting population were even more under repre-
sented. Only 2.5% of the members of Congress were Latinos. Congressional redstricting
plans that resulted after the 1990 census doubled the number of majority black and Lzatno
districts from 26 to 52. See Frank R. Parker, The Constitulonality of Racial RedIstrlcting: A
Citique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 DEr. C.L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
47. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.





Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court invoked strict scrutiny. He
made it clear that the failure by government to treat its citizens as
individuals justifies invoking strict scrutiny. Kennedy noted that the
claim recognized by the Court in Shaw v. Reno" was "analytically
distinct" from a vote dilution claim.51 Vote dilution alleges that the
State has enacted a particular voting scheme as a purposeful device to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minori-
ties.52 Vote dilution involves both racial classification of voters and
discriminatory effect. The equal protection violation recognized in
Shaw, however, was based on the State using race to separate voters
into districts. Thus, the claim recognized in Shaw-and applied by the
Court in Miller-involved racial classification of individuals, but not
discriminatory effect.
According to Kennedy, the problem with assigning citizens to vot-
ing districts based on race is that race-based assignments "embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating
their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a
criterion barred by Government . . .,,53 At the "heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command
that the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class' . ...
Kennedy compared the racial classification of voters into different vot-
ing districts to prior Supreme Court cases involving segregation of
public parks,55 buses,56 golf courses,57 beaches,5" and schools.59
50. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
51. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485.
52. In United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 US. 144 (1977), the Supreme Court held
that state legislative action which created majority-minority districts to comply with the Voting
Rights Act did not violate the constitution as long as they did not dilute white voting strength.
53. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827).
54. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2486 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602
(1990) (O'Connor, I., dissenting)).
55. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam).
56. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
57. See Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
58. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
59. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Kennedy's opinion citing to earli-
er cases as justification for the Court's decision in Miller suggests that the Court may also be
revisiting the harm of segregation in those prior cases. The segregation cases Kennedy cited
have generally been understood as cases involving harm to minority citizens beyond the simple
use of racial classifications. Thus, the plaintiffs in school desegregation cases, for example,
1010 [Vol. 29:999
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B. Strict Scrutiny Test
Given the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v. Johnson, Connecti-
cut's attempts to dismantle racial isolation in Hartford's public schools
will trigger strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, for the government to
justify the use of racial classifications, it must establish a compelling
governmental interest and employ a scheme that is narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that interest6 Distinctions based on race are con-
sidered by their very nature to be odious to a free people." Preferring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic
origin is discrimination in its own sake. The purpose of the strict
scrutiny test is to smoke out illegitimate uses of race by ensuring that
the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant the
use of a highly suspect tool.
The strict scrutiny test ensures that the means chosen fit this com-
pelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the mo-
tive for the classification is illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
Other reasons that strict scrutiny is applied to racial classifications are
preventing stigmatic harms, promotion of notions of racial inferiority,
and politics of racial hostility.64
1. Compelling State Interest
When evaluating proffered governmental interest for justifying racial
classifications courts recognize that the rights created by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause are by their terms guaranteed to the individual. a The
have always been minority school children and not white school children. As a result, the
segregation cases are normally understood as embodying the same harms that affirmative vacon
embody-denial of individuality as a result of racial classification and denial of some other
opportunity or benefit. By citing to these cases, Kennedy suggests that the primary constitu-
tional harm of segregation is the denial of individuality. It would therefore follow that since
whites were also being racially classified in determining Which public parks, buses, golf cours-
es, beaches, and schools they could visit or attend, they too were being harmed by segregation.
Thus under the interpretation of the harm discussed by Kennedy, those earlier cases-as well as
his opinion in Miller-can be viewed as discriminalion against both whites and blaCks, because
individuals of both races were treated as members of racial groups.
60. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995); Miller v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995).
61. See Hirabayashi v. United States 320 US. 81, 100 (1943).
62. See Regents of Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US. 265, 307 (1978); See also Browm v
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); Loving v. VirginIa, 388 US. 1, 11 (1967).
63. See City of Richmond v. JLA. Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 493 (1989).
64. See Ud.
65. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Shelly v Kraemer, 334
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United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what consti-
tutes a compelling state interest in a number of equal protection cases.
These discussions are relevant in determining whether Connecticut has
such an interest in its use of racial classifications so as to discharge the
affirmative obligation to dismantle racial isolation. These cases also
reveal an underlying structure that defines the nature of what constitutes
a compelling interests. This subsection will focus on the Supreme
Court's consideration of the compelling nature of various state interest.
It will also point to the focus on government respecting the individuali-
ty of its citizens. Finally, it will demonstrate the need for the State of
Connecticut to articulate an as yet accepted interest that will be com-
pelling enough to justify the use of racial classifications of its public
school students. The central focus in accepting or rejecting the com-
pelling nature of various governmental interests is whether they advance
or retard the notion of treating citizens as individuals.
a. Remedy for Past Discrimination
The only compelling interest recognized by a majority of the justic-
es on the Supreme Court is a remedy for past discrimination."' In
oxder to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, racial classifications
can be justified.67 The state has a legitimate interest in ameliorating or,
whereever feasible, eliminating the effects of identified discrimination.
The conclusion that such remedial measures are necessary requires
government to do more than make a mere assertion. To justify the use
of racial classifications for remedial purposes requires a judicial, legisla-
tive, or administrative finding of discrimination with a strong basis in
evidence.68
U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995)
('[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any government actor subject to
the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under
the strictest judicial scrutiny.").
66. Justice O'Connor in her dissent, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy in
Metro Broadcasting, Ina v. FCC, stated: "Modem equal protection has recognized only one
[compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination." 497 U.S. 547, 612
(1990).
67. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986).
68. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2491. In City of Pdchmond v. JA. Croson, 488
U.S. 489 (1989), the Supreme Court stated that the City of Richmond had not satisfied the
factual predicate for demonstrating past discrimination. The Court noted that the five predicate
facts relied upon by the District Court to establish identified discrimination singly or together
did not provide the City of Richmond with a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary. Those facts were:
(1) the ordinance declared itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents of the mnca-
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Past discrimination is the result of the denial of individuality to its
victims. Allowing a remedy for past discrimination to be a compelling
interest is an effort to move towards the furtherance of a society based
on a collection of individuals. The remedy is needed to eradicate the
effects-the denial of individuality--of the prior discriminatory conduct.
The use of racial classifications to redress the effects of de jure
segregation of public schools is an example of this compelling inter-
est.69 After the Supreme Court's opinion in Green v New Kent Coun-
ty,7" public school districts that engaged in de jure segregation were
under a mandatory obligation to achieve racial balancing. School dis-
tricts could not simply use racially neutral student assignment methods
to remedy the effects of de jure segregation if those methods did not
produce real desegregation.7'
Court-ordered desegregation was justified as a means by which to
dismantle the prior effects of government treating citizens as members
of racial and ethnic groups rather than as individuals. In other words,
the desegregation of public school students was the result of the failure
of government to treat citizens as individuals. Thus a distinction was
sure stated their views that there had been past discrimination In t he construction
industry; (3) minority businesses received 0.67% of prime contracts from the city
while minorities constituted 50% of the city's population; (4) there -were very few
minority contractors in local and state contractors' associations; and (5) in 1977 Con-
gress made a determination that the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority
participation in the construction industry nationally.
IL at 499. If the City could identify past discrimination in the local construction industry with
the particularity required by the Equal Protection Clause, It 'would have the power to adopt
race-based legislation designed to eradicate the effects of discrimination. See kL. at 509.
In Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), the court addressed a scholarship
program of the University of Maryland that was limited to Afiican-American students. See Id.
at 151. The University of Maryland attempted to justify the program as necessary to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination. It argued that the plan was necessary to address four
present effects: (1) the University had a poor reputation within the African-American communl-
ty; (2) African-Americans were underrepresented in the student population; (3) Afficari-American
students who enrolled at the University had low retention and graduation rates; and (4) the
atmosphere on campus was perceived as being hostile to African-Americaa students. See hL at
152. The court rejected the University's argument that the first and fourth effects represented
the type of discrimination that constitutes a compelling state interest See Ld. at 1S4-55. The
court went on to conclude that the second and third effects were not the type that wre nar-
rowly tailored. See id. at 157-162.
69. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke; 438 US. 265, 307 (1978).
70. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
71. For an articulation of the theory examining de jure segregation as a constitutional vlola-
tion from the perspective of the value inculcating function of public schools, see Kevin Brown,
Termination of Public School Dsegregation: Deternination of Unitary Status Based on the
Elimtination of Invhidous Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. II05 (1990).
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drawn between de jure segregation, which violated the Equal Protection
Clause and triggered the remedial burden and de facto segregation
which did not.72
Connecticut cannot use the compelling state interest that justified
prior federal court efforts to desegregate public schools. Unlike the de-
segregation ordered by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Shef,
federal court desegregation was remedial and not an affirmative obliga-
tion. It was taking account of race for the purpose of counteracting
prior discriminatory state action proven to have been a product of dis-
criminatory intent.73
b. Diversity in Education
In Regents of University of California v Bakke, the Supreme Court
addressed the case of Allan Bakke, a white male who was denied ad-
mission to the medical school of the University of California at Davis.
He argued that the State had discriminated against him because it oper-
ated a separate admissions program for members of minority groups.
Four justices in Bakke declined to reach the constitutional issue. For
them, the separate admissions program violated Title. VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. On this ground, they upheld Bakke's admission.
The opinion authored by Justice Brennan-and joined by Justices
White, Marshall and Blackmun--opined that racial classifications de-
signed to serve remedial purposes should receive only intermediate
scrutiny. These justices would have upheld the admissions program
under intermediate scrutiny because it served the substantial and benign
purpose of remedying past societal discrimination.
Justice Powell's opinion was the decisive swing vote. While apply-
ing strict scrutiny to an affirmative action program in higher education,
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke accepted the argument that diversity
was a compelling state interest that justified racial classification. He
noted that diversity of points of view furthered academic freedom
which was an interest embodied in the First Amendment that colleges
and universities possessed under the Constitution.74 Powell went on to
note that the interest in diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics, of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.7"
72, See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973).
73, See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 406-07 (Blackmnun, J., concurring).
74. See Id. at 312.
75, See 1d. at 315.
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Thus, the right of colleges and universities to select those students who
will contribute the most to the robust exchange of ideas is a counter-
vailing constitutional interest. Powell stressed, however, the importance
of viewing each student's application individually in order to determine
its quality and quantity of diversity.
Using the argument for diversity in education to justify mandatory
desegregation by the State of Connecticut is fraught with difficulty. To
begin with, public elementary and secondary schools do not have the
same right of academic freedom that exists for colleges and universities.
One of the principal justifications for academic fieedom is that colleges
and universities are there to criticize received wisdom. This critical
function requires protection from the vagaries of society. Criticizing
received wisdom is a far less significant feature of elementary and
secondary education than it is of colleges and universities. Secondly,
the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion focuses only on racial and
ethnic diversity. Thus, it rejects the broader concept of diversity in
education found by Justice Powell to justify considering race as a factor
in admissions decisions. Finally, if the Fifth Circuit opinion is correct,
in light of Supreme Court cases after Bakke, diversity in education may
not be a compelling state interest under any circumstances 6
Question has recently been raised regarding whether the Supreme
Court continues to recognize diversity in education as a compelling
state interestO In Hopwood v Texas78 the Fifth Circuit struck down
any use of race in determining admissions to the University of Texas
Law School. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Powell's views in Bakke
are not binding precedent on the issue. Powell has been the only Jus-
tice to conclude that diversity constitutes a compelling justification for
the use by government of racial classifications.79 In order to come to
the conclusion in Bakke that a college or university could use race as a
factor in the admission's procedure, Powell's opinion had to be com-
bined with that of Brennan's. Brennan's opinion did not apply strict
scrutiny and therefore judged the affirmative action program under a
76. I do not wish to in any way condone the Fifth Circuit's opinion In Hopwood by citing
to it in this article. Judge Wiener in his concurring opinion struck down the Univetsity of
Texas Law School's admissions program employed for 1992 by concluding that it violated
Powell's opinion in Bakke. Wiener specifically rejected the majority opinion's decision to de-
clare Bakke overruled. See Hopiwood, 78 F.3d at 963 (Weiner, J., concurring). I, too, would
argue that Bakke is still the governing law for admissions in higher education.




more relaxed standard. According to the Fifth Circuit, Brennan implic-
itly rejected Powell's opinion, including the notion that diversity in
education was a compelling state interest"
The Hopwood opinion also noted that the only other case in which
the Supreme Court accepted the diversity rationale was Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC."' In that case, the five-Justice majority relied
upon an intermediate standard of review to uphold a federal program
seeking diversity in ownership of broadcasting facilities. In 4darand, a
majority of the Supreme Court, however, rejected the intermediate scru-
tiny as the standard of review for racial classifications by the federal
government. According to the Fifth Circuit, 4darand vindicated Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting which was joined by three
other current members of the Supreme Court: Rehnquist Kennedy, and
Scalia.
Modem equal protection has recognized only one [compelling
state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination.
The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints
is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too 'amor-
phous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate
basis for employing racial classifications.8 2
Given Justice Clarence Thomas's condemnation of the use of "benign"
discrimination in his concurring opinion in Adarand, the Fifth Circuit
suggested that the majority of the current members of the Supreme
Court would uphold its decision.83
The Fifth Circuit also opined that, given the general principles of
the equal protection clause, the use of race in admissions for diversity
in higher education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of the
Equal Protection Clause." Since diversity treats students as members
of racial and ethnic groups, it could foster the use of race, rather than
minimize its importance.
c. Compliance with Legislative Enactments
In Miller v. Johnson, it was clear that the State of Georgia created
80. See Id. at 944.
81. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
82. "Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. It should be noted that the Supreme Court denied cert. on Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S.
CL 2580 (1996).
84. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
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the third majority-minority district to comply with the Justice
Department's preclearance requirements. The Court addressed an argu-
ment from Georgia that such compliance was a compelling state inter-
est. Kennedy's opinion rejected the argument that a state has a com-
pelling interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates the
Justice Department issues.' To accept the Justice Department's conclu-
sion that the Voting Rights Act required racial districting as a compel-
ling state interest would allow the Justice Department to determine the
constitutionality of such a provision-a role retained by the courts.
The Court's opinion reserved the issue of whether compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, standing alone, could provide a compelling state
interest independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination,
because such was not presented!'
MIer clearly indicates that the State of Connecticut will be unable
to justify the use of racial classification simply because its Supreme
Court found such efforts necessary in order to comply with a state
constitutional obligation. Given the Court's clear directive that the
federal judiciary has an independent obligation to determine the consti-
tutionality of a given interpretation, the Supreme Court of Connecticut's
affirmative obligation alone will not provide a compelling state interest.
This independent obligation is of special importance when the Fourteen
Amendment is involved. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to take from the State the ability to use race as a criterion for
government decision making.
d. Societal Discrimination/Role Models
The Supreme Court has recognized the fact that racial discrimina-
tion has exerted an effect on the current American society and contrib-
uted to a lack of opportunities for disadvantaged minorities." Never-
theless, the Court has consistently rejected societal discrimination as a
sufficient justification for the use of racial classifications!' It is con-
sidered too amorphous a concept to justify the use of racial classifica-
tions. 9 Because of the ubiquity of societal discrimination, to opimie that
85. See Mtller v. Johnson, 115 S. CL 2475, 2475-91 (1995).
86. See id at 2490-91.
87. See Wygant v Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 499 (1988).
88. Justice Powell first noted this in his opinion in Regents of the UnIv. of CaL v. B,,ke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978), which applied strict scrutiny.
89. See Wygan 476 U.S. at 276 (1986). This opinion was a plurality opinion written by
Justice Powell and joined by Burger and Rchnquist. Justice O'Connor joined all but Section
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it justified the use of racial classification would provide all governmen-
tal institutions in the Nation with a ready-made compelling justification
for using racial classifications. 0 Thus, government could always pro-
vide a compelling interest to advance the pursuit of societally disadvan-
-taged groups at the expense of societally advantaged *groups. The rec-
ognition of such a broad compelling interest would have undermined
the idea that the Equal Protection Clause is there to protect individuals.
In Wygant v Jackson Board of Education,"' the Supreme Court also
rejected the argument that providing role models for minority public
school students was a compelling state interest. In 1972, because of
racial tension in the community, the Jackson Board of Education con-
sidered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment between it and the Jackson Education Association (Union). The
provision would protect certain minority groups of teachers against
layoffs. The Board and the Union eventually agreed on a new provi-
sion for its collective bargaining agreement which provided that "in the
event of layoffs teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be
retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of
minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority
personnel employed as the time of the layoff." When layoffs became
necessary in 1974, it was obvious that adherence to this provision
meant that some majority teachers with more seniority would be laid
off in order to keep minority teachers with less seniority.
The Board's argument for the layoff provision was its interest in
providing minority role models for minority students as an attempt to
alleviate the effects of societal discrimination. The Court viewed the
role model theory as analogous to societal discrimination. The plurality
opinion noted that since the role model theory was not intended to be
remedial, it did not bear any relationship to the harm caused by prior
discriminatory hiring practices.'
In order for the Board to use the role model theory to justify the
use of racial classifications, the Board would have to treat and view its
teachers and students as members of racial and ethnic groups. For the
IV of the opinion and wrote a separate concurrence. Justice White made the fflh person In
the majority. His separate opinion concurring in judgment simply stated that the layoff policy
was no different than discharging whites and hiring blacks until the suitable percentage of
blacks in the work force was achieved. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (O'Connor, J.).
90. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.
91. 476 U.S. at 276.
92. See id
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Supreme Court to agree that providing role models for minority stu-
dents constituted a compelling state interest would require it to back
away from viewing the rights created by the Equal Protection Clause in
terms of the rights of individuals. Role model theory could be a com-
pelling justification only if one starts by viewing teachers and students
as members of racial and ethnic groups-a view that a focus on indi-
viduals must reject.
The State of Connecticut will not be able to justify the discharge of
its affirmative obligation to dismantle racial isolation in Hartford public
schools by asserting societal discrimination. Connecticut must articulate
a different interest if its plan to engage in compulsory integration is to
survive strict scrutiny.
2. Narrowly Tailored
In addition to the difficulty Connecticut will meet in providing a
compelling state interest, it must also address the second prong of the
strict scrutiny test. The measure employed must be narrowly tailored
to further the compelling state interest. In order for a measure to pass
this prong of the test, there must be no other means available that is
less restrictive than the one employed to fluther the state's goal.
In advancing the compelling state interest of remedying past dis-
crimination, the Court has indicated that it is necessary to consider the
use of race-neutral means to obtain the objective and whether the pro-
gram is appropriately limited such that it will not last longer than the
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.' The Court has also
suggested that, when possible, the beneficiaries should be limited to
those individuals who have suffered the effects of discrimination. In
Croson the Court noted that municipal contracts were awarded on a
case-by-case basis. Given the existence of an individualized procedure,
the City's only interest in maintaining a quota system rather than inves-
tigating the need for remedial action in a particular case would seem to
be simple administrative convenience. The City could investigate the
need for remedial action on a case-by-case basis. 4 According to the
Court, such a case by case treatment makes the program less problem-
atic from an equal protection standpoint, because it does not make the
applicant's skin color the sole relevant consideration 5
93. .See Adaand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995); City of Rlcunond
v. Croson, 488 US. 469, 508 (1988).




Powell's opinion in Bakke also addressed the narrowly tailored
prong of strict scrutiny. He made it a point of stating that the interest
in diversity is not just ethnic diversity for its own sake; rather, the in-
terest is the diversity that the individual student contributes to the stu-
dent population. Thus, each individual minority student must be com-
pared with other students to determine which student would promote
educational pluralism. 6 This kind of comparison treats each student as
an individual and not as a member of a racial or ethnic group. The
individual's race or ethnicity is viewed as simply one aspect of his or
her overall character.
The Court's application of the narrowly tailored aspect also shows a
concern for furthering the notion of a society of individuals. Like the
determination of compelling state interest, The Court's preference is to
advance individuality.
III. ROLE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AS A GOVERNMENTAL SERVICE
When government treats citizens as members of racial and ethnic
groups-no matter what the purpose--strict scrutiny is applied. Just as
the Georgia legislature treated its citizens as members of racial groups
in order to produce three majority-black legislative districts, the Con-
necticut legislature would have to treat public school students as mem-
bers of racial and ethnic groups in order to produce racially and ethni-
cally desegregated schools. In both situations, the legislature would be
treating citizens not as individuals, but as members of racial and ethnic
groups.
Can the conscious treatment of citizens as members of racial and
ethnic groups survive an equal protection challenge .in the context of
desegregating public schools, when it did not in the context of creating
majority-minority districts? To this point, the Supreme Court has not
accepted a compelling state interest that would justify the use of racial
classifications to achieve mandatory desegregation when pursued outside
of the remedial context. If such a compelling justification exists it
must rest on a fundamental distinction between public education and
other governmental services which justifies the dissimilar treatment.
The uniqueness of the function of public education can be found in the
confluence of two factors-those who attend public schools are chil-
96. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
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dren, and the primary purpose of education. These two factors suggest
that when government acts as educator of the young, it is operating in
a unique capacity. The use of racial classification in the one institution
which by its very nature is a transmitter of societal values to the young
may be sui generis.
In this section I will first examine the conceptual structure that
provides the hidden foundation for the Supreme Court's application of
the equal protection clause to racial conflicts. The Court seems to
view society as a collection of knowing individuals. It is not individu-
ality for the sake of individuality, however, that animates the Court's
recent equal protection opinions. The Court appears to be motivated by
a desire to protect the rights of individuals to be self-determining.
From the conception of society as a collection of knowing individuals
there is an implicit role for government, The role of government
however, when dealing with adults-who are choosers-requires a dif-
ferent focus than when dealing with children in public education-who
are learners.
A. Conceptual Structure and the Knowing Individual
The Supreme Court's primary method of resolving racial and ethnic
issues is by viewing American society as a collection of knowing indi-
viduals.97 Much of the Supreme Court's rhetoric on the harm of gov-
ernmental racial classifications contained in the controlling opinions in
cases like Bakke, ygant, Croson, Miller and Adarand, rests upon the
idea of furthering the self-determination of knowing individuals.
Knowing individuals are viewed as rational, autonomous, self-generat-
ing, and free-willed people who are capable of pursuing their self-for-
mulated goals and objectives. To hold this view requires that the indi-
vidual be seen as the source of its drive9 This requires a recognition
of an essential and hidden self that is viewed as the generator of the
desires and predilections of the individual. The ontological presupposi-
tion of this essential self is not only that it is unique for any given
individual, but also that it is capable of obtaining a self-reflective posi-
tion separate from all aims and attachments.' This split provides
97. This concept of the social world is one of the fundamental presuppositions of the pre-
dominant world view in contemporary Western society. See BARBARA SENKovi3 S7TMOE,
JusT EDUCArON: THn RiGHT To EDUCATION CO n= AND CO.VERSATION 101 (1991).
98. See ROBERT N. BELLAH Er AL, HABITS OF TaE HEARr. INDIVIDUALISM AND COmfhT-
M.m'T IN AMERICAN LFE 143 (1985).
99. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Critical Theory and Postmodernsmr: On the Infeiplay of Eth-
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knowing individuals with the ability to assess and revise their aims and
attachments.' °  The capacity for self-reflection means that their atti-
tudes, opinions and beliefs can be understood as products of individual
realization.
Americans have a strong belief in the sacredness of individual
choice. Violations of the right of individuals to think for themselves,
judge for themselves, make their own decisions, or live the lives they
see fit, is often viewed .as sacrilegious."°' Contemporary American
society, perhaps more so than any other society in human history, be-
lieves that the primary goal of life is for individuals to live in harmony
with their essential selves. Individuals seek to uncover their essential
self, decipher its qualities, separate it from that which might obscure or
alienate it, and then structure the remaining aspects of their life so that
they are in harmony with it." The presupposition of much of main-
stream American culture, and hence the journey of a lifetime that occu-
pies many Americans on an emotional, psychological and psychoanalyt-
ic level, is the search embodied in the attempt to comprehend and then
to live in harmony with the unique and hidden part of who one be-
lieves oneself to truly be.
Treating individuals according to a characteristic which they did not
choose denies them their ability to be self determining. But the crux
of the problem is not the denial of self-determination, it is the impair-
ment of the ability of individuals to obtain the state of individual har-
mony. It is for the pursuit of individual harmony that makes respect-
ing self-determination so important. The proper approach to racial and
ethnic considerations is to transcend those characteristics and deal di-
rectly with the essential self that is presumed to be at a distance from
all of the individual's characteristics including race or ethnicity. In this
way unchosen characteristics are not viewed as constraining the individ-
ual.
Even though knowing individuals should not be compelled to view
themselves as members of their racial and ethnic group, they must be
allowed the conceptual space by society in which to choose to celebrate
las, Aeshetics, and Utopia in Critical Theory, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435 (1990); sep abo PI-
erre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 181 (1990).
100. See Michael . Sandel, Religious Liberty-Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?,
1989 UTAH L. REV. 597, 598 (1989).
101. See BEuAH Er AL., supra note 98, at 142.
102. See HuBERT L. DRSYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MCHEL FOUCAULT. BEYOND
STUCTURALISM AND HERNEN=Cs 245 (2d ed. 1983).
[Vol. 29:9991022
771E MPLICATIONS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
their racial or ethnic heritage. As contradictory as it sounds, unchosen
characteristics are not to be eliminated, but placed on a level of
voluntariness. In order to achieve this notion, traditions of beliefs
embodied by racial and ethnic heritages must be converted for the
individual into matters of personal preference.10 3
The historical development of the concept of the knowing individu-
al in Anglo-American societies-that appears to animate the Supreme
Court's current application of the equal protection clause-was the
result of hundreds of years of intellectual development The origins of
this idea are rooted in Judeo-Christian theology which presupposes that
God created us as individual souls. The Judeo-Christian origins of
Western Civilization continue to provide the foundation for the funda-
mental belief in the existence of a unique -and hidden essential self (the
soul) for every individual.'
The roots of American liberalism can be traced to 17th century
England." There a new philosophy to justify individual rights that
were not based upon biblical or classical sources was developed. John
Locke was the key figure in the development of this philosophy. The
essence of Locke's philosophy was to view the rights of the individual
as prior to society. Judeo-Christian theology grounded the notion of
individuality in the design of an omnipotent God. In contrast Locke's
philosophy operates by accepting the reality of individuality, but with-
out basing it in the design of a creator God. Locke's philosophy start-
ed with the biological individual in a presumed state of nature. This
biological individual in a state of nature corresponds to the essential
self of the knowing individual. Both are presumed to proceed the
person in society. Therefore, both are the real self that is in control of
the individual's actions in society.
Locke developed a social order defined in terms of the relations of
these individuals to each other."6 Society comes into existence through
the voluntary contract of individuals trying to maximize their own self-
interest. 7 As a result society and government are there to protect
103. This involves a disrespect for beliefs that individuals find so fundamental as to constitute
a part of who they are because those constitutive beliefs must be understood as mauerz of
personal preference.
104. See 1 REMHOLD NIEBUH, T1m NATUw AND DSTINY OF MAN: A CsT INTEr-
PRETATO,4 21-23 (1964).
105. For a discussion of American individualism, see generally BELLAH Er AL., supra note
98.




those pre-ordained individual rights.
The benefit derived by individuals from this arrangement is the
noninterference with their pursuit of their own goals and objectives.
This benefit provides a sphere for each person which is immune from
interference by others. Making possible this mutual benefit is the as-
sumption by individuals of a burden. The burden requires that each
individual exercise self-restraint over their inclinations that would, if
satisfied, directly interfere or create a substantial risk of interference
with others' ability to pursue their goals and objectives.
B. Role of Government with Regard to Knowing Individuals
Government comes into existence in order to protect the rights of
knowing individuals. Government should be neutral on the question of
the good life or the good society, respecting equally all knowing indi-
viduals' pursuit of their various objectives. Government must both
respect the individuality of its citizens and mediate their conduct so as
to allow them to pursue their own desires and to prevent them from
unjustly interfering with the rights of their fellow persons to do like-
wise. By doing this, government allows individuals to choose their
own goals and ends for themselves consistent with a similar liberty for
others.' Government. is therefore charged with assuring that individu-
als receive the benefit as well as abide by the burdens which the social
contract entails.
No matter what the goal, when government classifies and treats
knowing individuals according to characteristics they do not
choose--such as race or ethnicity-it violates its primary function.
Government violates the individuality of knowing individuals when it
treats them as members of racial and ethnic groups for even laudable
purposes such as furthering an integrated society, countering the effects
of societal discrimination, reducing the historic deficits of disfavored
minorities in various professions,' or providing role models for minor-
ity students. To use race or ethnicity as a salient characteristic for
rights or duties means that government is treating people as members
of groups and not as individuals. While government should not treat
individuals as member of racial and ethnic groups, it must, however,
provide an environment tolerant of those who do choose to make their
108. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 101, at 598 (1989).
109. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-14 (1978).
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race or ethnicity a significant feature of their personal identity. Some
individuals will conclude that their individual harmony can only be
obtained by pursuing that lifestyle.
C. Rights of Children in Public Schools Differ from Those of Adults
In contrast to adults-who are viewed as choosers-children can be
seen as learners. Public education is the one place where government
is suppose to be actively involved in the socialization of the next gen-
eration of adult citizens. In the institution of public education, govern-
ment exerts a tremendous influence on learners in order to produce the
kind of choosers that possess the values necessary for the maintenance
of our democratic society. But public education, like other governmen-
tal functions, must maintain the neutrality that flows from the concep-
tion of society as a collection of individuals."1 Many recent Supreme
Court opinions addressing conflicts in public education have recognized
the socializing function of public schools as its primary function. This
general view of education has shifted the emphasis in educational dis-
putes from a rights-based to a values-based ideology."' Thus the pri-
mary concern of the Court should be to assure that schools are incul-
cating the type of values that minors need to internalize in order to
maintain a society of choosers.
1. Rights of Children
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the constitutional
rights of children differ from those of adults." The difference be-
tween minor and adult-however much we may be baffled by border-
line problems, demands for adequate criteria, and administrative diffi-
culties-is fundamental and inescapable.1 3 As Professor Tussman has
pointed out, no single set of principles can govern both minor and
adult; we need principles for both the caterpillar and tie butterfly."'
110. The equal protection clause's acceptance of society as a collection of mowing Individu-
als provides an implicit model of public education. This implicit model recognizes the con-
straint of governmental neutrality. For a discussion of that implicit model of education, see
Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion School?: The Paradoxes Created by
Legal Concep tualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813, 858-67 (1993).
111. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voic-
es of Dissent, 14 YALE L_ & PoL'Y REV. 169, 186 (1996).
112. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US. 622, 634 (1979).




The reasons the rights of children are different from those of adults
are obvious.' The cognitive development of children makes value-
inculcation of them inevitable. Children, like adults, will acquire val-
ues through innumerable influences on their lives including parents,
friends, church, writers, and television. Children, however, lack experi-
ence, maturity, and judgment of adults, and therefore cannot critically
evaluate what is being presented to them. Children must go through a
maturation process during which they will have experiences and devel-
op perspectives that will inevitably effect their view of themselves, their
fellow citizens, their country, and their world. " 6 After the end of this
maturation process, children will be accorded the rights of adults. No
matter how misguided their beliefs turn out, as adults they will be
entitled to act on their own ideas.
With respect to children, the question is not whether they will go
through a maturation process in which values will be inculcated, but
who will be involved in that process and how will it be structured. In
order for government to maintain its neutrality with respect to children,.
their rights should flow from providing an environment where they can
become the kind of citizens necessary for our democratic society. Thus
they must become choosers, but at the same time need to internalize
the values that will limit their choices to those that do not interfere
with the rights of their fellow citizens.
2. Public Schools are Primarily Sqcializing Institutions..
115. The Supreme Court has recognized "three reasons justifying the conclusion that the con-
stitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
116. Some commentators have challenged the notion that schools have an enduring effect on
the attitudes, values, and even intellectual development. See RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDN-
IAL SOCIETY 1-21 (2d ed. 1985); CHmSTOPHia JENcKs Er AL, INQUALIT: A RASSESs.
MENT OF THE EFrcr OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLNG IN AmAmu, 135 (1972). Collins stresses
that what is learned in school is rapidly forgotten and makes little contribution to the effective-
ness of adult role job performance. The importance of schooling for Collins lies in the general
acceptance of the principle that educational credentials are a fair and rational method of allocat-
ing occupational positions in American society. See COLLINS, supra, at 20-21.
This line of research presents a particular challenge to the discourse regarding the inculca-
tion of fundamental values. If the school's inculcation is ineffective, then arguably the expo-
sure to ideas that a child as an adult will be negligible. This conclusion, however, conflicts
with the exercise of the state's police power, or parens patriac, to compel attendance at school
experience does have an impact on how the child will view the world.
117. Public education also performs an important academic function. But the academic func-
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Public schools are institutions that acculturate America's youth.
They are inculcators of dominant American cultural values."' The
process of educating youth for citizenship is not confined to books and
curricular materials-schools also teach shared values by example." 9
Schools inculcate values, both through the curricular materials, as well
as through administrative rules and regulations governing student and
teacher conduct, including student assignment policies.
The establishment of public elementary and secondary schools with
concomitant compulsory school attendance statutes' reflects in part the
exercise by a state of its police power to assure the public health, safe-
ty, welfare, and morality.l Underlying the legitimacy of the establish-
ment of public elementary and secondary schools is the acknowledge-
ment that with respect to children, governmental power is not limited
to physical coercion and persuasion. While government must avoid the
indoctrination of competent adults, the fertile mind of the young is a
legitimate subject of public concern."n
The Supreme Court has addressed the socializing aspect of public
education on numerous occasions. 3  Many of the Court's recent opin-
tion is generally viewed as the distribution to students of a value free commodity thought of as
knowledge. Thus the academic function does not implicate the concern of the equal protection
clause in the way the socializing function does. For a further discussion of the value neutral
presupposition of the academic function of public schools see Brown, supra note 110, at 862-
65.
118. The term "values" is used in this Article to refer to moral, political, and social values,
including ideas, attitudes, opinions and beliefs.
119. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issue, 67
B.U. L REV. 603, 684 (1987). For example, rules prohibiting fighting on school premises
attempt to inculcate a belief that violence is not a legitimate means to resolve a dispute.
Rules requiring all students to attend the same classes and to start school at the same time
attempt to produce patriotic sentiment See, e.g., West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (holding that children cannot be compelled to salute the flag or recite the pledge of
allegiance in public schools).
120. Vitually every state plus the District of Columbia have adopted a compulsory school
attendance statute. See 2 Wm.umtm D. VALENTF., EDUCArON LAW: PuBtic Am PRIVA7E 466
(1985).
121. See. e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind. 1901); State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (NIL
1929); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (discussing
state police power with regard to zoning ordinances); Jacobson v. Mlassachusetts, 197 US. 11,
24-25 (1905) (discussing state police power with regard to medical vaccinations).
122. For a discussion of the rationale of allowing the Government access to the mind, see
TU shMN, mpra note 113. Tussman asserts that the public interest in the condition of the mind
is the most fundamental part of the public domain.
123. See e.g. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating a state statute that
proscr'bed the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools); Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating a state statute requiring Bible reading in public schools);
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ions have been extremely forthright about embracing the value-inculcat-
ing aspect of public elementary and secondary schools as its primary
role.' 24 In Board of Education v. Pico," the Court was presented with
the removal by school officials of controversial books from a public
school library. Even though the Court was sharply divided over the
outcome of the case, most of the Justices agreed that it was important
to examine public schools with an understanding that they are socializ-
ing institutions. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of three judges,
held that students possess a right to receive information and that right
is violated whenever school officials remove books from school librar-
ies in order to deny students access to ideas in those books with which
the school officials disagree. 26 In his opinion Justice Brennan wrote
"[the Court has] acknowledged that public [elementary and secondary)
schools are vitally important . . . vehicles for inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.' 27
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stated "the Court has ac-
knowledged the importance of the public [elementary and secondary]
schools in the preservation of values on which our society rests. Be-
cause of the essential socializing function of schools, local school offi-
cials . . . awaken the child to cultural values."'28 Justice Rehnquist, in
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a state may not require the reading of an
official state prayer in public schools even if pupils who wish to remain silent or be excused
may do so); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding against ad Equal
Protection Clause challenge a New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public
school teacher of any person who is not a United States citizen); Board of Educ. v. Pico, ex
reL. Pico, 457 US. 853 (1982) (limiting school board's discretion to remove books from the
school libraries); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding the authority of
public school officials to discipline a student for the content of a vulgar speech delivered at a
student assembly); Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding the
authority of public school officials to censor a student newspaper).
124. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeler, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding the authority
of public school officials to censor a student newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986) (upholding the authority of public school officials to discipline a student for the
content of a vulgar speech delivered at a student assembly); Board of Educ. v. Pico ex rel.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting school board's discretion to remove books from school
libraries); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding against an Equal Protection
Clause challenge a state statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school teacher of
any person who is not a United States citizen).
125. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
126. See id. at 871-72. Justices Marshall and Stevens joined Brennan's plurality opinion.
127. Id. at 864 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 876 (Blackmun J, concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun rdsted his
concurrence not on the right to receive information, articulated by Justice Brennan, but instead
on improper suppression of ideas by the school officials.
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his dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell, also placed emphasis on the socializing role of public elementa-
ry and secondary schools. In criticizing Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion which rested upon a right of students to receive information,
Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The idea that students have a right of access, in the school, to
information other than that thought by their educators to be
necessary is contrary to the very nature of an inculcative educa-
tion. Education consists of the selective presentation and expla-
nation of ideas .... Thus, Justice Brennan cannot rely upon
the nature of school libraries to escape the fact that the First
Amendment right to receive information simply has no applica-
tion to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a
place for the selective conveyance of ideas.'
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,"' the Court upheld-against a
free speech challenge-the authority of school officials to discipline a
student for delivering an address at a student assembly which made
suggestive use of vulgar and offensive terms. The Court rested its
opinion on the importance of the socializing function of public elemen-
tary and secondary schools. Citing its opinion in Ambach v.
Norwick,"' the Court stated:
The role and purpose of the American public school system
were well described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic
education must prepare students for citizenship . . . . It must
inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in them-
selves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the prac-
tice of self-government in the community and the nation." In
Ambach v. Norwick, ive echoed the essence of this statement of
the objectives of public education as the "inculcat[ion of] im-
damental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.
132
The recognition of the value-inculcating aspect of public education
was also a salient feature in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hazlewood
129. Id. at 914-15 (Reluquist, 3, dissenting) (second emphasis added).
130. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
131. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). For a discussion of Ambach, see infra notes 13846 and accompa-
nying text.
132. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (alterations In original).
102919971
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
School District v. Kuhlmeier.'" The Court addressed content-based
censorship by a school principal of articles that were to appear in a
student newspaper.13 Though this was also a hotly debated case, Oust
as in Pico) almost all of the justices focused on the socializing aspect
of public education. Writing for a five person majority, Justice White
upheld the principal's decision to censor the articles. White repeatedly
noted the importance of public elementary and secondary schools in
awakening children to cultural values.'35 In a dissenting opinion joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Brennan noted that "[public ele-
mentary and secondary schools] inculcatefl in tomorrow's leaders the
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic politi-
cal system..... .All the while, the public educator nurtures students'
social and moral development by transmitting to them an official dog-
ma of community values."'36
Pico, Fraser, and Kuhmeier all addressed First Amendment issues
arising in the context of public elementary and secondary schools. The
Court's first explicit articulation of the objectives of public education as
inculcating fundamental values, however, was in an equal protection
case, Ambach v. Norwick.37  Ambach is also an important case in that
133. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
134. See ia at 262-64. Principal Reynolds of Hazelwood East High School objected to two
student-written articles. One was an article describing three Hazelwood East studets' experi-
ences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.
Even though the pregnancy story used false names to keep the girls' identities a secret,
Reynolds was concerned that the students could still be identified from the text. Reynolds also
believed that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for
some of the younger students at the school. Reynolds' concern about the article on divorce
related to the fact that one of the students identified by name made defamatory comments
about her father. Reynolds felt that the students' parents should have been given an opportuni-
ty to respond to her remarks or to consent to publication. See Ia
135. See Id at 272, 274-75.
136. Id. at 278 (internal quotation marks omited) (citations omitted).
137. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). The Court also noted the importance of the value-inculcating func-
tion of public schools in another case addressing the application of the Equal Protection Clause
in public schools. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, reh'g denled, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
Plyler, however, was not decided primarily with reference to the value-inculcating function of
public schools. See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113-14
(1973) (Marshall, . dissenting) ("'Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government.' Education serves the
essential function of instilling in our young an understanding of and appreciation of the princi-
ples and operation for our governmental processes.") (citation omitted).
In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court noted that public
education "is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Id at 493.
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the court articulated in it the need to distinguish public education from
most other governmental services.
Ambach involved an equal protection challenge to a New York law
that forbade certification as a public school teacher of any person who
was not a citizen of the United States unless that person manifested an
intention to apply for citizenship. The appellees were two foreign-born
individuals who were otherwise qualified to teach in public elementary
and secondary schools.13 They challenged the law on the grounds that
it violated the equal protection clause, by employing a classification
based on alienage"' In upholding the New York law, the five justice
majority opinion authored by Justice Powell stated that although classi-
fications based on alienage are normally inherently suspect, there are
exceptions. 40 According to Powell, some state functions are intimately
bound up with the operation of the state as a governmental entity.
Exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become
part of the process of self-government shall not be reviewed under the
rigorous constitutional test normally applied to suspect classification. 4'
If the classification based on alienage relates to one of those govern-
mental functions, then it is reviewed under the lower rational relation-
ship standard. 42
In determining whether or not teaching in public elementary and
secondary schools constitutes a government function, the Court stated
that "we look to the role of public education and to the degree of re-
sponsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role."'4
According to the Court, "public education, like the police function,
fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.
The importance of public [elementary and secondary] schools . . . in
the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been
138. Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and was a citizen of Great Britain. She had
been a resident of the United States since 1965 and was married to an American citizen.
Appellee Dachinger was a Finnish citizen who came to the United States In 1966. She v,-s
also married to an American citizen. Neither of the Appellecs -anted to give up their citi-
zenship in their native countries. See Ambach, 441 US. at 71.
139. See i
140. See i. at 74-75.
141. See IhL at 73-74.
142. See La at 74. The Court noted that the distinction between citizens and aliens Is ordi-
narily irrelevant to private activity. However, the status of citizenship, Whether by birth or by
naturalization, denotes an association with the polity. The lack of this association provides
government entities with wider latitude in limiting participation of noncitizens. See IU. at 75..
143. Id. at 75.
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recognized by our decisions." 1" After finding the value-inculcating
function of public elementary and secondary schools fundamental, the
Court upheld the New York law under a rational basis review."4
IV. APPLICATION OF STRICr SCRUTINY TO MANDATORY DESEGREGA-
TI0N FROM A VALUES INCULCATION PERSPECTIVE
The Supreme Court of Connecticut's opinion in Sheffv. O'Neill146
rests upon the impact of desegregated schools on the socializing func-
tion of education. The Supreme Court of Connecticut indicated that
schools are important socializing institutions for imparting shared val-
ues. It favored integrated schools in Hartford as a means to inculcate
certain values to its public school students.
When government action affects the rights of adults, it is affecting
the right of people who are generally presumed to be capable of exer-
cising the capacity for free choice. Racially and ethnically classifying
choosers is anathema to their ability to be self-determining, because
they are being treated in accordance with a characteristic they did not
choose. Children in public schools, however, are learners not choosers.
Classification of them in public schools should be understood in the
context of its implications for learners. In a value-inculcating institu-
tion those implications are related to the values or messages being
carried by the use of racial and ethnic classifications.
An important socializing objective of public education is to advance
the minor's ability to become a chooser. This requires public education
to advance two conflicting objectives that government is to protect.
The learner must learn to become a self-determining chooser. But
equally important is the need for learners to learn to constrain their
choices in order to allow others the same right of self-determination.
Thus schools must strive to further the values of self-determination and
toleration. They must both advance and constrain individual choices at
the same time. When the Court focuses on whether mandatory deseg-
regation advances the objectives of a society of knowing individuals,
both objectives must be examined.
A. Mandatory Desegregation's Impact on Self-Determination
144. Id at 76 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See Id at 80-81.
146. 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).
[Vol. 29:9991032
97]7THE NMPSICON OF THE EQUAL PROTEC17ON CLAUSE
Forms of cultural beliefs that require the individual to submit his or
her will to some external standard such as the will of God, ethnic tra-
ditions, or racial affiliation, all inhibit the ability of knowing individ-
uals to live in a society that provided the necessary freedom for indi-
vidual self-determination. No concept could be more anathema to the
self-determination of knowing individuals than the restriction of their
range of options to historically ascribed traditions.
Today, we think of America as a place that has become the home
of new immigrants from China, Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Korea, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Philippines, Vietnam,
and many other countries. But before that America became the new
home of the English, the Scots, the Welsh, the Irish, the German, the
Poles, the Italians, the Slavs, the Dutch, the French, the Czechs, the
Russians, the Portuguese, and the Spanish. One of the primary motiva-
tions for the development of the concept of the knowing individuals
was to emancipate the individual from religious and feudal obligations
and loyalties that were the result of ascription and historical tradition.
147
To liberate the individual, the dead-hand grip of the past embodied in
Europe's religious, ethnic, and feudal traditions had to be overcome.
This emancipatory function took on particular importance in a society
like the United States, which is a land predominately of immigrants.
Immigration to the United States was the largest single voluntary mi-
gration in human listory. Between 1821 and 1924, total immigration
exceeded thirty three million people primarily from Europe. 48  As a
result, America was founded as a country of immigrants who came
from diverse old countries with different ethnic languages, cultures, and
heritages.
Not only did America have to contend with so many different eth-
nic groups, but these ethnic groups also brought with them different
religious traditions. The recent immigrants have brought with them
Buddhism, Shintoism, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism. These newly ar-
rived religions have added to* those of the Anglican, the Baptist, the
Puritan, the Calvinist, the Catholic, the Episcopalian, the Lutheran, the
Jew, and the Russian Orthodox. The character of American immigra-
tion changed drastically around 1880. A principally Protestant nation
began to see a large number of Catholic and Jewish immigrants. Be-
tween 1900 and 1930 the Catholic population doubled to 24 million.'49
147. See STENGE, mpra note 97 at 101.
148. See ROGER DANIlS, COMING TO AMERCA, A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETI c-
TY IN AmCAN Lin 23 (1990).
149. See Michael J. KIaan, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Ltbetis Fvolutlons 82
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The massive increase in the numbers of Catholics was replicated by the
number of Jews. Their population increased from 229,000 in 1887 to
over 4,228,000 forty years later.50
The emancipatory function of the knowing individual in America
served as a means to attenuate the sense of ethnic and religious group
identity for European immigrants. By reducing the sense of ethnic and
religious identity, large and destructive ethnic and religious conflicts so
often seen in Europe and other parts of the world were largely avoided
in America.
During the Civil Rights Era the concept of the knowing individual
was expanded to include blacks. At this time racial traditions that had
constrained the individuality of African-Americans were analogized and
treated in the same fashion that religious and ethnic traditions of immi-
grating Europeans had been previously treated.'
There has always been a nascent tradition in American society that
recognized blacks as individuals. 5 The origins of this tradition can be
traced to its earliest roots in the messages of some religious leaders in
colonial America. Over 100 years before the American Revolutionary
War, such leaders advocated a conception of society under God where
race did not matter. For example, Cotton Mather-the symbol of au-
thoritarian Puritanism-asserted the equality of slaves in the sight of
God. 53 Richard Baxter, another English Puritan, told slave holders in
1673 that slaves are as good a kind as you and even though their sins
have enslaved them to you, remember that they have immortal souls
and are just as capable of salvation as you are.5 4
Despite this rudimentary tradition, prior to the Civil Rights Move-
ment the African-American seldom stood at a distance from their race.
For African-Americans, race was not an object of their experience, but
a contradictory and irreconcilable part of their subjectivity. There was
little, if any, space ("-") between the African and the American (Afri-
can American) where race did not matter. Race was the trait that drew
VA. L. R v. 1, 49 (1996). Between 1850 and 1900 the number of Catholics increased from
1.7 million to 12 million. The number doubled again between 1900 and 1930. See t
150. See i This represented an increase from .5% of the nations's population to 3%.
151. For an extensive discussion of this ee Brown, supra note 110, at 834-37.
152. Individualism was embedded in the civic and religious structures of colonial life. The
term, however, was not given a name.until Tocqueville used "individualism" to describe the
restless American quest for material betterment. See BEi.AH Er AL. supra note 99, at 147.
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blacks together in a collective struggle against racial oppression. Thus
race provided the basis for the duties and obligations attendant upon a
member of a community that was struggling to overthrow its subjuga-
tion. This could be understood as the African side of their nomencla-
ture. Within the American arena in which the dominant understandings
about African Americans operated, however, race was the trait that
subjected blacks to discrimination and often brutalization. Race func-
tioned to subordinate and oppress black people. It was this suppression
that epitomized the American experience of blacks.
This duality of the African American soul was best described by
W. E. B. DuBois in his 1903 book The Souls of Black Folk As Du
Bois wrote:
[Ihe Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and
gifted with second-sight in this American world,--a world
which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him
see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a
peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of al-
ways looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of mea-
suring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,--an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. 55
The major event that inaugurated the Civil Rights Era and sparked
the Civil Rights Movement was the Supreme Court opinion of Brown
v. Board of Education.16 As an era in American history, this period of
time included many historically significant economic, social, legal and
political events. These events would include the Montgomery Bus
Boycott, the Freedom Rides, the March on Washington in 1963, school
desegregation litigation, passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968."
155. W. E BuRGHARDT Du BoIs, THE Souis OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKr=irs 16-
17 (1961). This printing contains the complete text of the original 1903 edition.
156. 347 US. 483 (1954).
157. In order to understand the influence that the desegregation era has had on our current
racialized thinking, it is necessary to recall its history. The conservative implications of the
civil rights agenda, which at the time were progressive, were not the ones that rallied African-
Americans to its support. We must recall that for the African-American the civil rights agenda
has suffered from an "ideological dri. (The terra "ideological drift" is one that I am bor-
rowing from Professor Jack Balkin. He notes that political and legal ideas can change their
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The Civil Rights Movement can be thought of as the liberating
ideological force that helped to bring about the major political, econom-
ic, social, and legal events of the era. Within the confines of a con-
ceptual structure of thought that views the world from the standpoint of
a society of knowing individuals, this movement can be viewed as
containing two separate and distinct ethoses. One ethos is negative and
will be discussed here. The second is positive and I will defer its
discussion until the next section.
The negative ethos was a liberating one. It attempted to free indi-
viduals that were black from the conceptual imprisonment attached to
the color of their skin. Thus the negative ethos of the Civil Rights
Movement called upon the emancipatory function that is contained in a
society viewed as a collection of knowing individuals. This ethos was
a search for a way out, an exit from the over-arching objectification
and subordination of people of color.5 This negative ethos sought to
problematize the understanding of blacks as permanent members of a
subordinated community and thus make an historical break with racial
attitudes that had been forged and maintained about blacks in the
past.159
This liberation applied not only to the subordinating aspect of being
black, but also to the duties and obligations imposed on the individual
by being a member of the African-American community. It was a way
for African-Americans to lose their blackness in the celebration of their
individuality. Hence, both the oppressive aspect as well as the unifying
political valence over time from progressive to conservative and back again. See J.M. Balkin,
Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 15 DuXE
LJ. 375, 383-84 (1990)). The civil rights colorblind agenda of the 1950s has been co-opted by
conservative ideology and used as a bar to race-based programs aimed at addressing the current
condition of African-Americans. By situating the civil rights agenda within its historical con-
text and accounting for the ideological drift that has occurred since the 1950s, we can begin to
see how the civil rights program was never intended to respond to the current situation with
regards to African-Americans.
158. Aflican-Americans have long been looked down upon by dominant American culture.
This point was discussed by Toqueville in Auxs DE ToQuEvn. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(Phillips Bradley ed, 1945). In a chapter entitled "The Present and Probable Future Condition
of the Three Races That Inhabit the Territory of the United States," Toqueville discussed the
racial mistreatnent of African-Americans. Also, in his 1944 epic, Gunnar Myrdal stated:
Upper class people in all countries are accustomed to look down upon people of the
laboring class as inherently inferior. But in the case of Negroes the deprecation Is
fortified by the elaborate system of racial beliefs, and the discriminations are orga-
nized in the social institution of rigid caste and not only of flexible social class.
GUNNAR MYRWAY, AMERICAN DEmmA 209 (1962).
159. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DKnE LJ. 758, 761 (1990).
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aspect of being African-American are to be transcended in favor of
allowing individuals to be self-determining. In other words, the Afri-
can and the American are both to be transcended so that the individual
can live within the "-" created between the other two selves. In effect,
the dual nature of the African-American soul was now to be divided
into three parts. With the third part, a sense of individuality becoming
dominant.
When federal courts engaged in remedial school desegregation, they
were attempting to remedy prior discriminatory conduct. Connecticut's
affirmative obligation must be examined outside of the remedial con-
text. Mandatory desegregation of public school students both conveys
and rejects the value of self-determination. On the one hand, bringing
students of different racial and ethnic groups together allows them to
interact with people of different racial or ethnic groups-on an indi-
vidual basis. By exposing students to people with different racial and
ethnic backgrounds it also allows them to be more informed about their
own backgrounds. Awareness of their backgrounds is necessary to
allow students to gain the ability to obtain a self-reflective position
from which they can accept or reject their received traditions. Thus
mandatory desegregation can be viewed as enhancing the ability of
learners to become self-determining.
Mandatory desegregation can also be viewed as conveying the
wrong message. Whether government is engaged in racial and ethnic
classification for the purpose of segregating students or integrating
students, both violate the constraint of neutrality because government is
not treating students as individuals. Mandatory desegregation sends the
message that students should think of themselves and others as mem-
bers of racial and ethnic groups and not as individuals. As a result
government is not liberating people from racial and ethnic traditions,
but sending a message that constrains them to racial and ethnic tradi-
tions.
Analyzing mandatory desegregation by focusing on self-determina-
tion does not definitively resolve the issue. Depending on how it is
understood, mandatory desegregation can inculcate values that further,
or constrain self-determination.
B. Mandatory Desegregation's Impact on Tolerance for Racial and
Ethnic Diversity
Being a citizen entails not just the benefits and privileges that come
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from being able to be self-determining, but also the duties and obliga-
tions to constrain one's choices. In a system of collective self-govern-
ment in which every citizen is viewed not only as an agent but also as
a subject, the ruler and the ruled affect each other. In order for citi-
zens to be self-determining they must have an interest in their fellow
citizens developing the values that will allow them to be self-determin-
ing. Toleration-the showing of understanding or leniency for conduct
or ideas conflicting with one's own-for those who are different pro-
vides as fundamental a core set of values as does the right of self-de-
termination.
There has long been a need for racial and ethnic toleration in
American society. Today America is the new home of recent immi-
grants from many diverse places, as well as the home of ethnic groups
with a longer history in this country. The need for toleration of racial
and ethnic diversity has always been important to American life.
America has always been a country of people with their own different
ethnic languages, cultures, and heritages.
The positive ethos of the Civil Rights Movement can be seen in its
demand by African-Americans to be accepted for being black. Accom-
panying the desegregation movement was also the mantra of "Black is
Beautiful" and the switch of nomenclatures first from Negro, to Black,
and then to African-American. These represented a demand by Afri-
can-Americans for respect and toleration of their heritage and way of
life.
The conception of society that follows from the concern about the
rights of knowing individuals does not eliminate the possibility that
people will choose to make their race or ethnicity a salient part of their
identity. Racial and ethnic differences are in theory to be placed upon
a voluntary basis. This means that government must ensure those who
wish to make their race or ethnicity an important aspect of their per-
sonal identity be given the conceptual space by their fellow citizens to
do it.
All students, regardless of race or ethnicity, need to be socialized to
be tolerant of these differences. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
noted that the fundamental values necessary for a democratic society
are jeopardized when students are educated in racially and ethnically
isolated schools.6 Ensuring that public school students internalize the
160. This point has also been made in a number of opinions from the United States Supreme
Court but perhaps no more forcefully than by Justice Clarence Thomas in his opinion in Hold-
er v. Hall 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (Thomas, . concurring).
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values of toleration for racial and ethnic differences is just as important
as them internalizing the values for self-determination. Exposing chil-
dren to those from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds assimilates
them into a pluralist culture and thereby prepares them for participation
in our democratic society. The court correctly stated that all students
benefit from racially and ethnically diverse schools. This is because
without the opportunity to get to know each other individuals of differ-
ent races and ethnicities can not gain understanding and mutual respect.
While it can be argued that self-determination is both advanced and
inhibited by mandatory desegregation, racial and ethnic tolerance is far
less equivocal. As a value, it is advanced by a racially and ethnically
diverse student body. School desegregation allows students from differ-
ent backgrounds to interact on an individual basis.
C. Application of Strict Scrutiny to Mandatory Desegregation
In order for the mandatory desegregation of Hartford public school
students to survive strict scrutiny, Connecticut must supply a compel-
ling state interest and demonstrate how the means chosen to advance
that interest are narrowly tailored. The rights created by the equal
protection clause are guaranteed to the individual. In order to give
itself the best chance to survive strict scrutiny, Connecticut should also
demonstrate how mandatory desegregation respects the individuality of
its students.
Connecticut can argue that the mandatory desegregation of public
students is necessary to further its interests of properly advancing the
ability of its students to become self-determining choosers. Mandatory
desegregation allows individual students to become more informed
about other lifestyles. Becoming more informed about racial and ethnic
differences furthers a minor's ability to obtain a self-reliant position
from which she can assess her received tradition. Minors as adults will
be better able to make informed choices about the lives they will lead.
In addition, racially and ethnically diverse student bodies also advance
the values of racial and ethnic toleration. Toleration of those who
choose to celebrate their racial and ethnic heritage is necessary for
them to pursue these lifestyles.
Connecticut can also demonstrate that mandatory desegregation is
narrowly tailored. The values that Connecticut seeks to advance are
ones that all students regardless of race or ethnicity need to internalize.
Mandatory desegregation is narrowly tailored because only those indi-
viduals who need to be subjected to the socializing process provided by
19971 1039
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
desegregated schools are effected. Thus Connecticut is respecting the
individuality of its students.
V. CONCLUSION
In Sheff v. O'Neill'6' the Supreme Court of Connecticut placed an
affirmative obligation on the state to eliminate racial isolation in Hart-
ford public schools. This obligation was placed on the state despite
any finding of intentional segregative conduct by state officials. In
order to discharge this obligation, Connecticut will have to treat its
students as members of racial and ethnic groups.
For Connecticut to discharge its affirmative obligation to dismantle
racial isolation in public schools it must overcome the obstacles im-
posed by recent Supreme Court cases. Despite the laudatory nature of
the goal that Connecticut seeks to achieve, given the Supreme Court
opinion in Miller v. Johnson,62 strict scrutiny will be triggered. Con-
necticut will have to justify its use of racial classifications by showing
that its scheme is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state inter-
est. Supreme Court precedent has not yet provided a compelling state
interest that would justify the use of racial classification for purpose of
desegregating public schools.
In order to comply with strict scrutiny requires that there must be
something unique about public education. The role of public education
suggests that its unique features may justify a different analysis for the
use of race and ethnic classification in public schools than it does out-
side of that context. Public schools are responsible for inculcating
fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of our democratic
society to minors. In the context of public education, the use of racial
classifications should be viewed in light of public schools' socializing
function. Thus, the primary question about using racial classifications
of public schools must focus on the message being conveyed by their
use.
Connecticut can demonstrate that mandatory desegregation can pass
strict scrutiny. Connecticut has a compelling interest in the proper
socialization of public school students. The fundamental values that
161. 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).
162. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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public schools should advance must foster individual choice. At the
same time, however, they must constrain those choices to allow others
the ability to choose as well. Mandatory desegregation may be able to
advance the ability of students to become self-determining and certainly
contributes to toleration of racial and ethnic differences. All students
need to internalize the values of liberty and self-determination and
tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity. Therefore, mandatory desegre-
gation is narrowly tailored to advance the State's compelling interest.

